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Abstract
A pervasive thought in contemporary Philosophy of Mathematics is that in
order to justify reflection principles, one must hold Universism: the view that
there is a single universe of pure sets. I challenge this kind of reasoning by con-
trasting Universism with a Zermelian form of Multiversism. I argue that if extant
justifications of reflection principles using notions of richness are acceptable for
the Universist, then the Zermelian can use similar justifications. However, I note
that for some forms of richness argument, the status of reflection principles as
axioms is left open for the Zermelian.
Introduction.
The development of Set Theory since Go¨del’s seminal result on the consistency with
ZF of the Axiom of Choice and Continuum Hypothesis has been marked by a signif-
icant phenomenon: independence results. Set-theoretic practice is now replete with
model-theoretic techniques that facilitate the study of diverse models of ZF and its
variants, thereby providing witnesses to the consistency of various statements with
ZF . Broadly speaking, there have been two philosophical reactions to the indepen-
dence phenomenon in set theory: those who think that the independence of state-
ments (such as CH) from ZFC is indicative of a failure of bivalence1 and those that
do not.
Before proceeding any further, we should note that bivalence in Set Theory is a
tricky subject. Indeed, one may hold that some independent statements (such asCH)
are bivalent while still asserting that there are (in a set-theoretic context) non-bivalent
statements. For example, it is a reasonable position to hold that CH is bivalent,
while at the same time asserting that it is not bivalent whether or not there exists an
inaccessible cardinal. Indeed this is a position that has been advocated by several
authors, including recently by [Isaacson, 2011]. I am concerned here with two views
that do hold that statements concerning the ‘width’ (id est the subsets formed at Vα
for successor ordinals α) at stages indexed by (relatively) small α are bivalent, and
hence CH is bivalent.
The two views are the following:
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[Universism] There is a single, unique, universe of sets which is maximal
with respect to height and width. Each Vα is to be understood as an initial
segment of this universe.
This contrasts sharply with the following:
[Zermelian2 Multiversism] There is no one unique universe of pure sets
that is maximal with respect to height, but rather a series of universes, all
of which satisfy second-order ZFC2. Each universe, when viewed from
a taller universe (or from the Universist’s perspective), is of the form Vκ
for strongly inaccessible κ, and no one Vκ is especially privileged.
It will be useful to introduce some terminology from the outset in order to make
discussion more precise. By the term ‘PZ-universe3’, I mean any model of ZFC2
(with the full semantics), and denote these universes using V , V ′, V ′′ et cetera. Oc-
casionally, it will be more convenient to refer to a particular V by viewing it as a
particular Vκ in some taller V ′ (where meaning is clear from context). By the term
‘CZ-universe4’ I mean any V that satisfies the Zermelian’s currently best justified the-
ory of sets.5 We assume that the Zermelian has an adequate justification for the use
of ZFC2 (with the full semantics) from the outset. The philosophical and metamath-
ematical issues here are thorny6, but (as we shall see below) the acceptance of ZFC2
as our initial best theory of sets is part of the Zermelian’s motivation for her7 posi-
tion. In order then to tackle the Zermelian from her own perspective, we shall put
aside issues concerning the justification of ZFC2 and use of the full semantics.
We should start by noting that each view has much to recommend it. The former,
held by Go¨del and Cantor8, has a certain aesthetic and semantic simplicity to it: our
theories of sets describe a single universe about which we may reason and prove
facts absolutely9. The latter, held by Zermelo, neatly avoids the problem of proper
classes by having the ‘proper classes’ of one V be sets in some taller V ′. Further, if
one thinks that categoricity is important for an account of reference to mathematical
objects10, then Zermelian Multiversism is motivated by the fact that ZFC2 is only
quasi-categorical in the sense that for any two models of ZFC2, either they are iso-
morphic or one is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of the other. This has been
seen by several authors (including Isaacson and Zermelo himself) as indicative of
the failure of our thought and language to uniquely determine one universe of sets
rather than a plurality thereof.11
2One must specify that the view to be discussed is Zermelian in order to distinguish it from Multiver-
sisms of significantly different character, such as the views presented in [Hamkins, 2012].
3For reasons to be made clear later, ‘PZ-universe’ stands for ‘Primordial Zermelian Universe’.
4Here,‘CZ-universe’ stands for ‘Canonical Zermelian Universe’.
5As we shall see, the distinction between PZ-universes andCZ-universes will be important for under-
standing the sense in which reflection principles can be viewed as axioms for the Zermelian Multiversist.
6See, for example, [Hamkins, 2012] and [Meadows, 2013].
7To avoid ambiguity, I will use the female pronoun for the Zermelian (when Zermelo himself is not
being denoted) and the male pronoun to denote the Universist.
8There is some disagreement in the literature whether or not Cantor was actually a Universist in the
sense outlined here. For a view that argues that in fact he was not, see [Linnebo, 2013].
9Throughout this paper, I speak as if sets are mind-independent, abstract entities, and put aside prob-
lems standardly associated with Platonism. It is an interesting question how much of the discussion could
be formulated in the absence of this assumption, but one that I lack the space to address here.
10For just such a view see [Isaacson, 2011].
11It should be noted that there are extant attempts to provide full categoricity results for set theory. A
good example here is [McGee, 1997] who uses a theory augmented with urelemente to prove the categoric-
ity of the pure sets. As the significance of the result is controversial (the proof requires both unrestricted
first-order quantification and that the urelemente form a set) and the philosophical issues subtle, we set
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We now have two incompatible views before us, each of which appears to be
reasonably well motivated. In order to try and inform the debate, a natural method-
ology is to see how each view behaves with respect to mathematical practice. In
particular, we shall examine here how the views interpret certain kinds of mathe-
matical statements, and how each addresses issues of justification.
Often reflection principles are cited as a problematic case for the Zermelian.12
This paper provides criticism of this line of argument. In particular, I shall argue
that if it is assumed that extant Universist motivations for reflection principles are
satisfactory, then the Zermelian can make use of similar motivating ideas in justify-
ing her own forms of reflection. Despite this, I address some limitations: though the
Zermelian is able to capture many of the pleasing theoretical features of reflection,
the status of principles justified through ineffability as axioms is left open. My strat-
egy is as follows: In §1 I outline reflection principles, in particular the distinction
between strong and weak varieties. §2 then explains the problem that some have seen
for the Zermelian Multiversist. In §3 I argue that justifications of reflection princi-
ples based on the closure of the ordinals apply equally well on the Zermelian’s view,
putting her in the same position as the Universist. Finally, §4 argues that motivating
reflection through notions of direct ineffability allow the Zermelian to also justify the
non-vacuity of both weak and strong forms of reflection. However, I note that it is
unclear that the Zermelian can argue that these principles are axioms. I conclude that
if the Universist can motivate reflection using these notions of richness, then the Zer-
melian Multiversist can both (i) motivate the non-vacuity of this discourse, and (ii)
provide justification for many of the pleasing theoretical consequences of reflection
arguments.
1 Varieties of reflection.
Reflection principles present an excellent test case for studying particular philoso-
phies of set theory. There are two main reasons for this. First, such principles are
mathematically fruitful (in ways to be made precise later). Second, many set theorists
and philosophers regard these new ‘axioms’ as natural principles.13
We should first be precise about the kinds of principle with which we are inter-
ested here. Reflection principles are of the following general form:
[RP1] (∃α)(φ→ φVα)
This states that if some formula φ is satisfied simpliciter then it is satisfied by some
Vα. More informally, one can view a reflection principle as saying that any property
held by the universe is held by some initial segment of the universe.
Of course, what one allows as the relevant φ in one’s reflection principle is going
to affect the results one gets. If we consider only first-order formulae φ, the following
principle of reflection is as uncontroversial as the axioms of ZFC, following as it
does from them:
[RP2] ∀α∃β > α∀x¯ ∈ Vβ [φ(x¯)↔ φVβ (x¯)]
Allowing higher-order formulae produces stronger and stronger reflection prin-
ciples. For instance, allowing second-order sentences to be reflected yields inacces-
sible cardinals. If one then asserts that formulae are reflected to a Vκ with κ strongly
this result aside. For the purposes of seeing the Zermelian’s motivations, it suffices to note that ZFC2 is
only quasi-categorical.
12See, for example, the excellent [Koellner, 2009].
13See, for example, [Bernays, 1961], [Reinhardt, 1974], and [Fraenkel et al., 1973].
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inaccessible, one produces Mahlo cardinals. Reflecting then to Mahlo cardinals re-
sults in α-Mahlo cardinals.14 One can move to a higher-order language, thus allow-
ing stronger and stronger reflection principles and thereby producing a hierarchy
of cardinals known as the indescribable cardinals.15 However, one will always stay
below the first ω-Erdo˝s cardinal.16
One might try to achieve extra strength via the introduction of parameters. Care
is required, however, as it has been shown by Tait that admitting unrestricted third-
order parameters results in a contradiction [Tait, 2005]17! Tait instead tries to gain
extra strength whilst avoiding contradiction using restricted forms of higher-order
parameters in reflection principles. However, Koellner has since showed that all of
Tait’s principles are either inconsistent or remain below the first ω-Erdo˝s cardinal
[Koellner, 2009]. Let us call such reflection principles (whose strength is below the
first ω-Erdo˝s cardinal) weak reflection principles.
Despite these setbacks, recently Welch has proposed a (much stronger) global re-
flection principle. Welch’s principle has its conceptual roots in the reflection argu-
ments used by Reinhardt in [Reinhardt, 1974], which in turn are somewhat similar to
the ideas at play in [Magidor, 1971]. Reinhardt’s principles, though technically fasci-
nating, face deep philosophical challenges (see [Koellner, 2009]), and so we focus on
Welch’s presentation here.
Welch proceeds by considering a structure denoted by ‘(V,∈, C)’. Here we aug-
ment the standard structure (V,∈) (where V is the universe of all sets), with the
collection of all parts of V , id est all classes (to be denoted by ‘C’). Welch then (for
reasons to be discussed later), argues that there should be a reflection of (V,∈, C) to
some (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1). This may be stated as follows:
[RP3] There is a non-trivial elementary embedding18 j and ordinal κwith
crit(j) = κ such that:
j : (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1) −→ (V,∈, C)
This states that there is a non-trivial elementary embedding j from some (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1)
to (V,∈, C). In this way the structure which we may talk about in our language of
(V,∈, C) is reflected in some (Vκ,∈ Vκ+1).
It should be noted here that this principle differs substantially from standard re-
flection principles in that is posits the existence of an elementary embedding, rather
than simply asserting that formulae are reflected. It is important to bear in mind
that the very kind of ontological commitment being made is much stronger than in
standard reflection principles. In particular, when using strong reflection principles,
14A Mahlo cardinal is a cardinal κ such that every normal (id est continuous and increasing) function
on κ has a strongly inaccessible fixed point. Similarly we iterate this definition for α-Mahlo cardinals, a
cardinal κ being α-Mahlo iff every normal function on κ has an (α− 1)-Mahlo fixed point.
15A cardinal κ is Q-indescribable (where Q is of the form Σmn or Πmn ) iff for any X ⊂ Vκ and sentence
φ of Q order and complexity, if 〈Vκ,∈, X〉 |= φ then there is an α < κ such that 〈Vα,∈ X ∩ Vα〉 |= φ.
16The first ω-Erdo˝s cardinal is the least cardinal satisfying certain combinatorial properties on a parti-
tion into its finite subsets. As the definition of the cardinal is somewhat involved and is not central to my
argument I omit it here, however details are available in a wide variety of texts including [Drake, 1974],
[Kanamori, 2009], and [Jech, 2002].
17The result that reflection with unrestricted third-order parameters is inconsistent is often attributed
to Reinhardt in [Reinhardt, 1974]. However, the proof is not explicitly given and arguing that Reinhardt
published the result depends on a generous interpretation of the following comment: “It does not appear
to be possible to generalize (S3) [a reflection principle] in this direction [third-order parameters] very
easily. (The reader who does not believe this is welcome to try.).” ([Reinhardt, 1974], p196).
18The level of elementary insisted upon results in different technical consequences: see [Welch, 2014]
for details. These technical details have no bearing on my argument here, for any level of elementarity
desired the arguments carry over immediately.
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we commit ourselves not just to the satisfaction of some formula(s) by a particular
Vα, but also to the existence of the relevant j. This might lead one to hold that the
moniker of ‘reflection principle’ is somewhat misleading, and a different term would
be appropriate to make clear the distinction between the two. However, one can see
the sense in which such principles imply reflection of a sort: they assert that there is
a great deal of resemblance between V and some initial segment thereof.19
2 Motivating reflection principles: The problem for the
Zermelian Multiversist.
The central problem that the Universist raises for the Zermelian Multiversist is di-
rect and simple: reflection principles involve mention of the truth of a formula φ
simpliciter. A natural way to understand this is through holding that φ is true in the
Universe of sets, an entity that is not countenanced by the Zermelian’s philosophy.
Tait expresses this point as follows:
“From this viewpoint [Zermelian Multiversism] the ‘paradoxes of set the-
ory’ vanish. But also from this viewpoint...reflecting down from the uni-
verse of all sets, becomes problematic. For it seems to require that we
know what it means to say that a sentence φ(t) is true in the universe of
all sets.” ([Tait, 2003], p473)
We may characterise the issue in the following way. The Zermelian Multiversist
asserts that there is no maximal universe of sets but rather an unbounded sequence
thereof, in which we are always implicitly or explicitly restricted. Worries of paradox
are thereby removed20: apparently ‘paradoxical proper classes’ are merely sets in
some expanded domain. However, by denying the existence of the ‘real V ’ we lose
the coherency of statements involving V that we wish to reflect to particular Vα: we
cannot yet say what it is for φ to be true in the Universe of all sets.
Let us draw the problem out a little further, in order to be precise as to where
the difficulty lies. There are two challenges the Universist might try to raise for the
Zermelian:
1. Naturalism. The view is unable to underpin (even in principle) formalisations
of the relevant principles.
2. Motivation. The view is unable to adequately motivate and justify the princi-
ples which we would like to be true for doing set-theoretic mathematics.
Now, for the Zermelian Multiversist (1.) is not a problem. For, though V does
not exist on the Zermelian standpoint, this does not mean that they do not ascribe
any meaning to the use of the term ‘V ’. Indeed it would be strange if the Zermelian
rejected all set theory that mentioned ‘V ’: such use is ubiquitous across set-theoretic
discourse.21
19Many thanks to Peter Koellner and Sy Friedman for emphasising to me the importance of this dis-
tinction. As we shall see in §3 and §4, another substantial difference between weak and strong reflection
is the kinds of justification that have been offered for the principles.
20There is a substantial debate as to whether or not the problem is truly avoided: in stating that there
is an unbounded sequence of models we seemingly have to be able to understand what ‘absolutely un-
bounded’ means, and hence understand the totality of ordinals. The issue is well-worn in the literature
on absolute generality, and I set it aside here.
21A good example being the characterisation of large cardinal properties in terms of non trivial elemen-
tary embeddings j : V −→ M, for transitive inner models M. The exact nature of these embeddings
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We should pause briefly to see how a Zermelian interprets the use of the term ‘V ’
within their philosophical framework. Central here is the emphasis placed by the
Zermelian on the quasi-categoricity theorem. As noted earlier, the Zermelian regards
the failure of our use of set-theoretic language to pin down a single intended model
up to isomorphism as significant. This is one of the main motivations for the Zer-
melian view, and is indicative of the tight link she draws between ontology and the
use of language. Since, the Zermelian argues, it is impossible22 to give a mathematical
characterisation of the universe of sets (for any characterisation of some V , one can
assume that it is some Vκ in a larger universe), there simply is no one single universe,
rather the universes are many.
Thus, on a given occasion of utterance of set-theoretic sentences, the models that
can serve as referents of the term ‘V ’ are determined by the sentences uttered and
the given context. In this way the Zermelian’s account of reference is schematic, in
the sense that the universes that can be referred to by ‘V ’ must be of the correct form
to satisfy the uttered sentences. To see this more clearly, consider a different kind of
schematic phenomenon: axiom schema. To take a relatively simple example, we may
state the Comprehension Scheme for systems of second-order arithmetic as follows:
∃X∀n[n ∈ X ↔ φ(n)]
Where φ(n) is a formula of second-order arithmetic in which X is not
free.
This axiom scheme allows us to substitute formulae just in case they are of the
right ‘shape’. Now, what counts as the right shape is going to vary from context to
context. We may only allow, for example, arithmetical formulae into the Compre-
hension Scheme when working in the context of ACA0. However a shift in context
may liberalise what we allow into the Comprehension Scheme (say to Π11 formulae
in the context of working in Π11 − CA0). From an expanded context of utterance , it
is legitimate to substitute different formulae for φ(n) compared to the context23 of
ACA0.
A somewhat similar (though inverse) phenomenon is occurring on the Zermelian
picture. On a particular use of the term ‘V ’, we are able to interpret ‘V ’ as referring
to a PZ-universe of the correct form. So, given an utterance of ZFC2 not involving
any large cardinal notions, any PZ-universe that satisfies ZFC2 is able to serve as
a referent for the term ‘V ’. However, as we start to involve stronger notions, fewer
universes can be referred to by the term ‘V ’. For example, if a Zermelian is working
in the context of ZFC2+ “There exists an inaccessible cardinal”, then (assuming that
some inaccessibles do in fact exist), the smallestPZ-universe satisfyingZFC2 cannot
serve as a referent of the term ‘V ’ as it does not contain any inaccessibles.
We thus see why, in a given context, (1.) is no problem. The utterance of some
sentences of second-order set theory involving the use of reflection (either weak
or strong) may simply be interpreted locally where ‘V ’ is taken to denote schemati-
cally some PZ-universe satisfying the principle in question. In the context of weak
reflection, the relevant universe V will reflect higher-order sentences down to ap-
propriate initial segments Vα. Viewed from a universe V ′ in which V appears as
some initial segment Vβ , there will be reflection from Vβ to various Vα (for α < β).
For example, if κ is totally indescribable24, then Vκ will model ZFC2 plus reflec-
and the relationships they bear to their set-like surrogates (such as ultrafilters and extenders) is a knotty
philosophical issue in itself, and one I shall not consider in this paper.
22This only holds of course, if we disallow the addition of ad hoc anti-large cardinal axioms or the
controversial results in [McGee, 1997].
23Indeed often notation is used to keep track of these contexts and associated subsystems.
24A cardinal κ is totally indescribable iff it isQmn -indescribable for bothQ = Π,Q = Σ, and anym,n ∈ ω.
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tion for any second-order sentence. Such a PZ-universe would therefore be able
to serve as a referent of the term ‘V ’ in the context of talking about the (weak) re-
flection of any and all second-order sentences. A similar move can be made in
the case of strong reflection. Letting ‘C′’ denote the classes of an appropriate PZ-
universe V ′, and Vβ an initial segment of V ′, we can interpret [RP3] as an embed-
ding j : (Vβ ,∈, Vβ+1) −→ (V ′,∈, C′). Again, when viewed from a larger universe
V ′′ in which V ′ = Vα for some strongly inaccessible α, the embedding will be from25
(Vβ ,∈, Vβ+1) to (Vα,∈, Vα+1).
Thus, we see that as long as the Zermelian can secure the existence of some PZ-
universe satisfying the relevant reflection, she can secure the non-vacuity of math-
ematical discourse involving the use of such principles (thereby avoiding problems
of Naturalism). However, some authors have seen a problem for the Zermelian Mul-
tiversist in the form of Motivation, and it is to this issue that I now turn.
2.1 Reflection and justification.
Let us take stock. We have seen that as long as the Zermelian can justify the exis-
tence of the required PZ-universes, she can secure an interpretation of set-theoretic
discourse involving reflection principles over structures satisfying ZFC2. However,
though the talk of reflection principles can be formulated in terms of the relevant
PZ-universes, she has not yet developed an explanation of why the relevant reflec-
tion principles should be true. Koellner presses the worry as follows:
“On the actualist view one can refer to the totality of sets and thus one
can articulate the idea that this totality cannot be described from below
and hence satisfies the reflection principles...On the potentialist26 view
the closest one can come to speaking of the totality of sets is through
speaking of some Vα. One can certainly make sense of higher-order quan-
tification over Vα but now the difficulty lies in motivating and justifying
reflection principles.” ([Koellner, 2009], p209)
Here, Koellner claims that the difficulty with reflection is precisely the issue of
Motivation. Given that V does not exist for the Zermelian, why should we say that
there are any PZ-universes that facilitate the reflection? Since, on her view, any
particular PZ-universe does not represent ‘the absolute’, why should we think that
any V is ineffable in the sense that properties reflect from V to its initial segments?
The situation for the Universist is different: they may very well hold that V is in some
sense uncharacterisable and hence there are reflections from V down to particular
Vα. If the Zermelian cannot motivate the existence of V of the desired kind, then the
mathematics that they wish to interpret becomes vacuous.
There are difficult philosophical issues here surrounding what is meant by Koell-
ner’s use of the terms ‘justification’ and ‘motivation’. I shall take these terms to refer
to roughly the same phenomenon: we are concerned with arguments that purport
to establish that particular principles hold on certain kinds of structure. There are at
least two dimensions in which the meaning of such terms can vary for a Zermelian.
25The existence of such an embedding implies that β is 1-extendible. For details, see [Kanamori, 2009].
26Koellner’s Potentialist and my Zermelian differ subtly: the Potentialist need not hold that the subject
matter of Set Theory is constituted by only the models of ZFC2, they merely hold that the subject matter
of set theory is “open-ended [in height]”. While one may be a Potentialist but not a Zermelian, it is true
that Zermelian Multiversism represents a form of Potentialism, and so Koellner’s arguments carry over
to the present case.
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The first concerns a well-rehearsed distinction27 between two kinds of justifica-
tion: intrinsic and extrinsic. A full examination would require a significant literature
on its own, however in order to clarify the notions (especially with respect to Koell-
ner’s arguments) we shall nonetheless examine the issue a little here. We begin with
some infamous quotations from Go¨del. Characterising intrinsic justification, Go¨del
writes:
“First of all the axioms of set theory by no means form a system closed in
itself, but, quite on the contrary, the very concept of set on which they are
based suggests their extension by new axioms which assert the existence
of still further iterations of the operation “set of”...These axioms show
clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set theory as used today is
incomplete, but also that it can be supplemented without arbitrariness by
new axioms which only unfold the content of the concept of set explained
above.” ([Go¨del, 1964], pp260-261)28
and
“also there may exist, besides the ordinary axioms,...other (hitherto un-
known) axioms of set theory which a more profound understanding of
the concepts underlying logic and mathematics would enable us to rec-
ognize as implied by those concepts” ([Go¨del, 1964], p261)29
These quotations require some unpacking before we have a precise characterisa-
tion. Key to the above passages is the thought that intrinsic justifications are con-
cerned with unfolding and explaining particular concepts. We determine, via con-
ceptual analysis, what principles are implied by the mathematical conception with
which we are working. Such a characterisation, as it stands, is somewhat unclear:
what constitutes a satisfactory ‘unfolding’ of a concept is itself in need of explaining.
Koellner makes the issues a little more precise:
“One can also gain a sharper understanding of the notion of intrinsic
justification by pointing to some of its properties. First, an intrinsically
justified statement need not be self-evident, in part because the justifica-
tion may be quite involved (for example, in the case of arithmetic, this
would be the case with reflection principles at the level of some large or-
dinal approaching Γ0), in part because it is possible that the underlying
conception is problematic (as, for example, was the case with the Fregean
conception of extension). On the other hand, the notion of intrinsic justi-
fication is intended to be more secure than mere “intrinsic plausibility”...
in that whereas the latter merely adds credence, the former is intended to
be definitive (modulo the tenability of the conception).” ([Koellner, 2009],
p207)
27See, for example, [Maddy, 1988a], [Maddy, 1988b], [Maddy, 1990], and [Koellner, 2009]. The roots of
this distinction go back at least to [Go¨del, 1947] and plausibly even [Russell, 1907].
28Here, I use [Go¨del, 1964] rather than [Go¨del, 1947] (p181) for a couple of reasons. First [Go¨del, 1964]
represents Go¨del’s more mature philosophical views (and indeed he was more satisfied with his com-
mand of English during this period: see [Moore, 1990]). Second, his wording leaves the kinds of justi-
fication he has in mind more open: in [Go¨del, 1947] he is clearly more concerned with weak reflection
principles, referring to “axioms which are only the natural continuation of the series of those set up so
far”, rather than those that “unfold the concept of set”.
29See p182 of [Go¨del, 1947] for the relevant passage, essentially similar in content.
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So we have a picture on which intrinsic justifications proceed via (possibly quite
involved) conceptual analysis, to provide definitive justification of certain principles.
It is unclear whether or not Go¨del himself took intrinsic justifications to be “defini-
tive” (certainly many of the terms he used, such as “intrinsic necessity”, indicate that
this may well have been the case). There is also the separate question of whether or
not we should take intrinsic justification to be definitive or simply a matter of degree
or adding credence. I do not wish to become entangled in these tricky issues here.
Since our interest is in comparative issues of justification between Universist and
Zermelian Multiversist, we may remain neutral on the issue of whether intrinsic jus-
tification is an ‘all or nothing’ matter. What we wish to show is that whatever level
of justification the Universist has, the Zermelian has also.30
The notion of intrinsic justification contrasts with that of extrinsic justification.
Rather than providing reasons to think that a principle results from conceptual anal-
ysis of a particular mathematical conception, extrinsic justification concerns its theo-
retical consequences. Explicating the notion, Go¨del writes:
“Secondly, however, even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some
new axiom, and even in case it had no intrinsic necessity at all, a proba-
ble decision about its truth is possible also in another way, namely in-
ductively by studying its “success”. Success here means, fruitfulness
in consequences, in particular in “verifiable” consequences, i.e., conse-
quences demonstrable without the new axiom, whose proofs with the
help of the new axiom however, are considerably simpler and easier to
discover, and make it possible to contract into one proof many different
proofs.” ([Go¨del, 1964] p261)31
and
“A much higher degree of verification than that, however, is conceivable.
There might exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable consequences,
shedding so much light upon a whole field, and yielding such powerful
methods for solving given problems (and even solving them construc-
tively, as far as that is possible) that no matter whether or not they are in-
trinsically necessary, they would have to be accepted at least in the same
sense as any well-established physical theory.” ([Go¨del, 1964], p261)32
Again, the philosophical and exegetical issues here are both difficult and sub-
tle. For our purposes, it suffices to note that extrinsic justification is concerned with
the consequences of a particular principle rather than whether or not the principle
follows from a particular conception.
Now it is clear that the kind of justification with which we will be interested is
primarily intrinsic. The facts of mathematical theorems are not disputed between the
Universist and Zermelian Multiversist and so any extrinsic evidence for particular
assumptions will carry over equally well between the two views. Instead, we are
concerned here whether or not the Zermelian can provide intrinsic motivation for
the relevant reflection principles.
It would be dialectically significant if it were the case that the Zermelian Multi-
versist could not intrinsically justify reflection principles where the Universist could.
30As we shall see later, this holds only modulo some uncertainties concerning the meaning of the term
‘axiom’ and the notion of ‘truth’ for a Zermelian.
31Here p182 of [Go¨del, 1947] does not differ substantially from [Go¨del, 1964].
32Again here, [Go¨del, 1947] (pp182-183) is not significantly different from the [Go¨del, 1964] revision.
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For reasons I outline below, we might think that if the Universist can motivate reflec-
tion principles she can in turn motivate a better theory of sets on his ontology. One
might think this is important: if I can motivate a better theory of sets on my phi-
losophy where you cannot, then we might think that (ceteris paribus), I have a better
philosophy.
Several well-trodden facts from the set-theoretic literature are relevant here. We
survey just two, one for strong reflection principles, and one for weak. It will serve
first to briefly remark on the genesis of reflection principles originating in the work
of [Levy, 1960] and [Bernays, 1961]. Recall the first-order reflection scheme:
[RP2] ∀α∃β > α∀x¯ ∈ Vβ [φ(x¯)↔ φVβ (x¯)]
As noted earlier, such a principle is provable from first-order ZFC. However,
there is slightly more to the issue than this. For, one can prove from ZC+[RP2] with
the Axiom of Infinity removed, both the Axiom Scheme of Replacement and the
Axiom of Infinity. Thus, insofar as one regards ZFC as explicating our conception
of set, some form of reflection is also essential: principles that are often held to follow
from this conception turn out to be jointly equivalent to first-order reflection.
Indeed, the progression is natural as we move through the orders of reflection
principles. For, many of cardinals produced by weak reflection principles are equiv-
alent to the existence of fixed-points on normal functions. For example, second-order
reflection is equivalent to Mahlo’s principle that any unbounded sequence of ordi-
nals has at least one initial segment which tends to a fixed-point.
Why is this significant? Many (such as [Bernays, 1961] and [Drake, 1974]) have
seen the existence of fixed-points of normal functions as indicative of the ‘absolutely’
unbounded nature of the ordinals, a thought which one might think is desirable
given the Iterative Conception of Set.33 The key idea here is that by indexing the
stages of the Cumulative Hierarchy by the ordinal number sequence, we are com-
mitting ourselves to the principle that there is no way of exhausting the ordinals
with an enumerating function without hitting a fixed-point. Such cardinals are pre-
cisely what is delivered by the higher-order weak reflection principles, and might
lead one to think that if the Universist can motivate these principles where the Zer-
melian cannot, then the Universist has a better theory of the Iterative Conception of
Set.
The theoretical benefits of strong reflection principles concern the significant re-
duction in incompleteness provided by the substantive large cardinals implied. There
is a large and detailed literature on the matter, so we mention just one case here.34
The statements which constitute much of the discussion are so called axioms of
definable determinacy. For ease of presentation, we restrict our attention to determi-
nacy concerning projective sets.
Projective Determinacy is the following statement:
[PD] Every ω-length game of perfect information whose winning condi-
tion is a projective set is determined.
The details surrounding PD are rather technical35 , and so I suppress them here.
For our philosophical purposes, it suffices to note three facts concerning PD:
33This is, it must be admitted, a controversial assumption. However, it is one that is not without its
adherents.
34For further philosophical and technical exposition, the reader is directed to [Woodin, 2001],
[Koellner, 2009], [Koellner, 2010], and [Welch, 2014].
35For details see [Kanamori, 2009]. For a comprehensive (but challenging) presentation of the relation-
ship between determinacy axioms and large cardinals, see [Koellner and Woodin, 2010].
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1. PD is independent from ZFC.
2. The truth value of PD is settled in the first few levels above Vω (and hence has
the same truth value for both the Universist and Zermelian).
3. PD has pleasing theoretical consequences.
It is a well known fact that PD is independent from the axioms of ZFC.36 (2.) is
true in virtue of the fact that PD is a statement concerning sets of infinite sequences
of natural numbers, the games (conceived of as trees) that may be played over them,
and strategy functions on these trees. Hence, all objects involved in the statement
of PD occur a finite number of levels above Vω . Since, these levels are the same on
both the Universist and Zermelian Multiversist’s ontology, they should both assert
that PD is bivalent (and indeed has the same truth value).
The issues surrounding (3.) are again technical, but we mention just one conse-
quence of PD. As [Woodin, 2001] notes, PD provides us with a complete theory of
the countable sets in the same way that PA provides us with a complete theory of
the natural numbers: there are no known sentences involving the hereditarily count-
able sets (other than Go¨delian diagonal sentences) that are independent of the theory
ZFC−+PD+V = HC.37 In this way, both PA andZFC−+PD+V = HC pin down
the truths about the objects of their intended model, even if there are still indepen-
dent statements concerning the theory. It seems then that there are reasons to want
PD to be true: the near-completeness of PD over the countable sets is theoretically
desirable.
It is thus natural for both the Universist and the Zermelian Multiversist to look
for additional axioms to settle statements such as PD. The following is a theorem:
Theorem 1. [Martin and Steel, 1989] If there are infinitely many Woodin
cardinals38 then PD holds.
So, there is a proof available of PD. However, one should note the resources
required to prove the theorem. The existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals is,
philosophically speaking, a significant ontological assumption deserving of scrutiny.
Therefore, aside from the proof provided, we would like justification of why PD
should hold.
PD may well be argued to have some extrinsic justification in virtue of its pleas-
ing theoretical consequences, insofar as the results above can be considered kinds of
‘fruitfulness’.39 However, one might not be satisfied with justifications of this kind.
Indeed, both the Universist and Zermelian Multiversist would like to argue that it is
their ontology that motivates the best possible theory of sets. Thus, each might seek
intrinsic justification for PD by showing that either it can be given direct intrinsic
justification, or it follows from other intrinsically justified principles.40
36To see this note that PD is false in L (Determinacy in fact fails in L at level of Π11 sets of reals). The
fact that ZFC 6` ¬PD follows from the Martin-Steel Theorem outlined below.
37Here ZFC− refers to ZFC with the Power Set Axiom removed (usually a subset collection scheme is
substituted instead), and V = HC refers to the statement that the universe is all and only the hereditarily
countable sets. For additional details, see [Welch, 2014].
38A Woodin cardinal is an ordinal κ such that for all functions f : κ −→ κ there is some α < κ such that
{f(β)|β < α} ⊆ α and there is a non-trivial elementary embedding j from V to some transitive inner
modelM with critical point α such that Vj(f)(α) ⊆ M. For discussion and alternative characterisations,
the reader is directed to [Kanamori, 2009].
39The status of extrinsic justifications for PD turns out to be very subtle and technically involved,
depending upon interrelations between axioms of definable determinacy and (inner models of) large
cardinals. The reader is directed to [Maddy, 1988b] and [Koellner, 2010] for a discussion.
40Of course, one might think that we should not even be looking for intrinsic justification of statements
such as PD. This is certainly a tenable viewpoint, and one with which the author has a some sympathy.
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It is unlikely that the former plan is will be successful. Before understanding its
pleasing theoretical consequences, there is little to choose between PD and its nega-
tion. For example, Donald Martin (who jointly with John Steel provided the proof of
PD from the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals) wrote the following:
“Is PD true? It is certainly not self-evident.” ([Martin, 1977], p813)41
Given then that PD does not seem to admit of direct intrinsic justification, the
only other alternative for providing intrinsic justification is to show that it follows
from principles that are so justified. As remarked earlier, the existence of infinitely
many Woodin cardinals will secure the result, but seems a weighty ontological as-
sumption in need of further justification of its own. Here we find a roˆle for reflection
principles.
Indeed, Welch’s global reflection principle delivers the result almost immedi-
ately:
Theorem 2. [Welch, 2014]ZFC+[RP3] ` “There exist proper-class-many
measurable Woodin cardinals.”
Hence, [RP3] delivers (more than) the required Woodin cardinals to prove PD.42
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic justification represents one respect
in which justifications can differ for a Zermelian. The challenge there is to provide
intrinsic justification for both the reflection principles and their pleasing theoretical
consequences (PD in the context of strong reflection, and ordinal unboundedness
for the weak variety). There is, however, another dimension in which justification
varies on a Zermelian picture. Once she has settled on a method (or methods) of
justification, she has to decide precisely what it is that she is trying to establish.
First, she could be justifying the claim that mathematical discourse involving certain
principles is non-vacuous. Second, she could be answering the question of whether
such principles are justified as axioms.
Recall earlier the schematic account of reference provided, on which a given ut-
terance of some set-theoretic sentences can refer to some V satisfying these sentences.
There, we saw that the range of PZ-universes that can figure as referents of the term
‘V ’ are determined by the sentences uttered. So, if the Zermelian is to motivate re-
flection principles as non-vacuous, she has to motivate the existence of at least one
universe V of the required kind. Then, for some reflection principle [RP ], when a set
theorist utters sentences of the form ZFC2 + [RP ] there will be at least one V which
can be taken as the schematic referent of ‘V ’. Since, for the Zermelian, every V is an
initial segment of the form Vα in some taller V ′, the challenge amounts to justifying
the existence of at least one Vα satisfying the relevant properties (id est, for β < α,
reflection to Vβ in the case of weak reflection, and for strong reflection an embedding
j : (Vβ ,∈ Vβ+1) −→ (Vα,∈, Vα+1)).
It should be noted here that justification of the existence of one PZ-universe satis-
fying reflection secures much of the desirable theoretical consequences of that prin-
ciple. In the case of PD, a single PZ-universe satisfying [RP3] will ensure the ex-
istence of the necessary Woodin cardinals to prove that PD is true in every PZ-
However, one should accept that if an ontological view can intrinsically motivate a better theory of sets
than another, then it is in this respect a better view of ontology.
41There are several other places similar comments by Martin (and others) can be found, for example:
[Martin, 1976], p90 [Moschovakis, 1980], p. 610. For an excellent discussion of PD and justification, the
reader is once again directed to [Maddy, 1988b].
42The existence of a proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals has some other nice theoretical results,
see [Woodin, 2001], [Woodin, 2010], and [Welch, 2014] for examples and discussion.
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universe (by the Quasi-Categoricity Theorem and the fact that the set-theoretic ob-
jects determining the truth value of PD appear in the first few levels above Vω).
In the case of weak reflection, a single PZ-universe satisfying the required principle
will ensure that there are at least some contexts in which the ordinals are unbounded
in the relevant sense.43
However, there is an additional question for the Zermelian: can she motivate
the truth of reflection principles as axioms? Here, we find a roˆle for the distinction
between PZ-universes and CZ-universes.
Consider again the claim that there exists an inaccessible cardinal (let the corre-
sponding sentence be denoted by ‘φ’). Now φ is false in the smallest V : if κ is the least
inaccessible then Vκ |= ¬φ. However, we would be reluctant to say (assuming that
the existence of an inaccessible is independently motivated) that φ’s status as a set-
theoretic axiom is thereby vitiated. Rather, it seems correct to say that our canonical
best theory has changed. It is no longer simply ZFC2, but rather ZFC2 + φ. This is
reflected, for the Zermelian Multiversist, in how we best interpret set-theorists when
they intend to speak in the broadest possible context. Thus, through justified theory
expansion, the range of CZ-universes can change, shrinking as we independently
motivate more axioms and augment ZFC2. What was, primordially (for Zermelo),
the range of canonically justified universes, is changeable based on justified theory
expansion.44 Thus φ retains its status as an axiom in virtue of being true in every CZ-
universe satisfying the independently motivated principles. To sum up, our original
challenge of Motivation diverges into two salient problems:
1. Can the Zermelian Multiversist motivate the existence of at least onePZ-universe
satisfying weak/strong reflection, thereby providing referents for contexts in-
volving the principles and securing their pleasing theoretical consequences (id
est PD in the case of [RP3] and for weak reflection the existence of certain
ordinals and iterative levels)?
2. Can the Zermelian motivate the truth of these principles as axioms in the sense
that they are true in all CZ-universes?
As we shall see, an analysis of the Universist’s motivations for accepting reflec-
tion principles yields responses for the Zermelian Multiversist (though questions
concerning point (2.) remain). For, there is an extant challenge for the Universist: I
have said nothing yet about their motivation for reflection principles. What is re-
quired by the Universist before the discussion can proceed is an adequate bridging
principle that tells us why reflection principles should hold.
Consider one of the original motivations for reflection principles given by Go¨del:
“The Universe of sets cannot be uniquely characterized (i.e. distinguished
from all its initial segments) by any internal structural property of the
membership relation in it, which is expressible in any logic of finite or
transfinite type, including infinitary logics of any cardinal number.” (Go¨del
in [Wang, 1977])
Here, Go¨del argues that the universe is ‘ineffable’: it is impossible for us to de-
velop a sentence in any language that applies to the universe and not one of its initial
segments. Merely asserting this is one thing, but why should it hold?
43We shall see later that the issues here are subtle, the justificatory status of PD (under [RP3]) and
ordinal unboundedness (under weak reflection) may come apart.
44Hence the use of the terms ‘primordial’ and ‘canonical’ to describe the different kinds of Zermelian
universes.
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One way authors have tried to justify ineffability is through assumptions of rich-
ness. We can distinguish two main kinds of richness assumption to which Universe
Theorists have appealed: arguments from ordinal closure and notions of direct ineffa-
bility.
3 Richness as ordinal closure.
The first way in which we might justify (weak) reflection principles is simply to
reverse the direction of argument concerning reflection principles and the Iterative
Conception of Set. It was noted earlier that a motivation of weak reflection princi-
ples was that they produce a ‘better’ theory of the Iterative Conception in that they
give mathematical content to the claim that the stages of the Cumulative Hierarchy
are ‘absolutely unbounded’. Instead, we might argue that it is part of the Iterative
Conception that V is closed under certain kinds of operation, and thus (by the work
of Montague, Levy, and Bernays) satisfy the various forms of reflection.
Let us be a little more precise. There are three distinct but closely linked ways
of postulating the closure of sequences of ordinals. The main contenders (and those
that have received the most attention) are the use of fixed-points, indescribability prop-
erties, and Tait’s approach. I consider each here, and show how the Zermelian can
avail themselves of very similar justifications in order to motivate the existence of
particular V that can act as referents for the term ‘V ’ in discussions of reflection prin-
ciples.
3.1 Functions and fixed points.
The simplest kind of ordinal closure I shall consider is in terms of derivatives of
enumerating functions.45 We begin by postulating the existence of inaccessibles by
arguing that the intersection of the regular cardinals and Beth numbers is non-empty.
Effectively this states the closure of the ordinals under the two main size-generating
principles of ZFC2 after the Axiom of Infinity: the Power Set Axiom and Replace-
ment Axiom. The justification behind this is that the operations of Power Set and
Replacement are not enough to characterise the whole ordinal number sequence:
the process will always ‘run out’ in the sense that we arrive at a fix-point.
Once we have one cardinal of this variety, it is natural to postulate that there is a
proper class of elements of the intersection, corresponding to repeated applications
of this process, thereby leading to a proper class of inaccessible cardinals.
We now wish to iterate this definition to obtain higher levels of inaccessibles. Let
I0 be the proper class of regular Beth numbers. For any class X , let FX be a (class-
sized) function enumerating the elements of X . Further, let F ′X be the fixed points of
FX . We may proceed by asserting that F ′I0 has a proper class of elements (these are
the 1-inaccessibles). This can clearly be iterated through the ordinals. More formally
we have the following recursive definition:
Definition 3. I0 = The class of regular beth cardinals.
Iα+1 = F
′
Iα
for successor α.
Iλ =
⋂
β<λ Iβ
45I am indebted to Peter Koellner for explaining to me both justifications involving derivatives and
Tait’s approach.
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As we move through the ordinals we describe higher and higher levels of inac-
cessibility, gradually thinning out the class of original inaccessibles.
A similar kind of process is visible for stronger forms of ordinal closure. For
example, we might argue for Mahlo cardinals in the following way. We first note
that:
Definition 4. κ is Mahlo iff {β < κ|“β is inaccessible”} is stationary (in
that it intersects every closed unbounded subset of κ) in κ.
or equivalently:
κ is Mahlo iff every normal (id est continuous and increasing) function on
κ has a strongly inaccessible fixed-point.
We can then postulate that there is a proper class of Mahlo cardinals. We are
asserting here that each κ in this class extends so far that the set of inaccessibles
less than κ must meet any club set of κ. Equivalently, we assert that every normal
function has a strongly inaccessible fixed-point: κ continues ‘so far’ that no matter
what normal function we pick on κ there is a fixed-point of inaccessible cardinality.
Of course the definition can be iterated through the ordinals:
Definition 5. κ is 0-Mahlo iff κ is inaccessible.
κ is (α + 1)-Mahlo iff {β < κ|β “is α-Mahlo” } is stationary in κ (equiva-
lently: every normal function has an α-Mahlo fixed point).
κ is λ Mahlo iff κ is β-Mahlo for all β < λ.
So we have a characterisation of large cardinals in terms of fixed-points of normal
functions. This suggests the following Axiom:
Axiom 6. Every normal function on the ordinals has a regular fixed point.
By the work of Levy and Bernays, this turns out to be equivalent to:
Axiom 7. [RP4] ∀α∃β > α[Inac(β) ∧ ∀x¯ ∈ Vβ(φ↔ φVβ )]
which asserts that reflection occurs between V and Vβ for inaccessible β. Of
course, we can generalise the closure under fixed points to include cardinals of any
kind whose existence we have already accepted, essentially asserting that the type
of cardinal does not exhaust the ordinals without hitting a fixed-point. Letting Φ(x)
be one of, “x is inaccessible”, “x is α-inaccessible”, “x is Mahlo”, or “x is α-Mahlo”
we can then generalise to the following axiom schema:
Axiom 8. Every normal function on the ordinals has a fixed-point of kind
Φ.
Again, by the work of Levy and Bernays, this is equivalent to having a ver-
sion of [RP4], where Inac(β) is replaced by Φ(β). This justifies reflection princi-
ples that increase in strength as we push the reflection up through the inaccessible,
α-inaccessible, Mahlo, and α-Mahlo cardinals.
Whatever one thinks of the plausibility of these closure arguments, let us assume
that they are satisfactory on the Universist’s picture. How does this justification for
weak reflection principles affect the arguments against the Zermelian?
There are two obvious problems with taking this route if the Universist is to es-
tablish superiority over the Zermelian with respect to motivating weak reflection.
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The first is that it makes one of the main arguments for wanting to intrinsically
justify weak reflection hopelessly circular. Earlier it was noted that the Universist
would be in a better dialectic position if she could motivate weak reflection where
the Zermelian could not, as she would have motivated from her own view the ‘abso-
lute unboundedness’ (in the sense of closure under fixed-points) of the stages of the
Cumulative Hierarchy, and hence have a better theory of the Iterative Conception
of Set. But now this form of ‘absolute unboundedness’ is being assumed and taken
as the starting point in intrinsically motivating the reflection principles. The desired
pleasing theoretical output of the reflection principles (the unboundedness of the or-
dinals under fixed-points of normal functions), is being used in order to motivate the
principles themselves.
The second problem is that the Zermelian Multiversist can perfectly well appeal
to this sort of motivation also. For, the Zermelian may subscribe to the Iterative
Conception as much as the Universist, thereby transferring any intrinsic motivation
conferred from unfolding said conception. So if closure under various kinds of fixed-
point is entailed by the Iterative Conception simpliciter, then the Zermelian is allowed
to appeal to said closure.
Let us explore this in a little more detail. The Universist is asserting that there
should be no conceivable end to the ordinal number sequence. For example, Drake
puts the point as follosets of ws:
“We look for justification for these axioms [id est reflection principles]
from the point of view of the cumulative type structure, where we want
to say that the collection of levels, which is indexed by the ordinals, is a
very rich structure with no conceivable end.” ([Drake, 1974], p123)
We see the justification then: since there is no conceivable end to processes of
generating ordinals from others, we should assert that the ordinal number sequence
is closed under formation of these fixed-points, and hence V satisfies the relevant
reflection principles.
If the Universist may say this about the ordinal numbers and closure of the Cu-
mulative Hierarchy, then so may the Zermelian. Thus she may perfectly well say
that the same fix-points on normal functions exist, and hence the same cardinals ex-
ist. Thus on this justification, at least from the point of view of motivating a theory
of the ordinals for the Iterative Conception, the Zermelian is able to produce exactly
the same objects and degree of unboundedness.
There are two natural responses on behalf of the Universist that admit of a uni-
form solution. The first is to note that the Zermelian holds that she is always im-
plicitly restricted to particular Vκ. Thus (the Universist argues) she cannot say that
“Every normal function has a fixed point of kind Φ”, due to the restriction she fails
to talk about ‘all’ functions.
The second objection is to point out that even if the Zermelian manages to moti-
vate the existence of the relevant cardinals, she still has not motivated the existence
of the relevant V to witness reflection on her ontology. It is one thing to motivate the
existence of the cardinals produced by reflection, and another to motivate the (suitably
interpreted) principles themselves.
Both these objections ignore the account of reference and quantification on the
Zermelian Multiversist’s understanding. Earlier it was noted that use of the term
‘V ’, and any associated universal quantification, is schematic: ‘V ’ applies to any
appropriate V . So the Zermelian can perfectly well say that “there should be no
conceivable end to ‘the ordinals’ and hence every normal function on ‘the ordinals’
has a fixed point of kind Φ”. It is simply that in saying so, this holds relative to some
16
V = Vβ , under which every normal function on OnVβ has a fixed point of kind Φ.
Vβ will then satisfy all of the requisite reflection properties given by the Bernays-
Levy equivalences, thereby guaranteeing the Zermelian the PZ-universe she needs
to ensure the non-vacuity of discourse involving the weak reflection principle.
What then of the status of the principle as an axiom? Well, if it is intrinsically
justified (in the sense of being implied by the concept of) the Iterative Conception of
Set that the ordinals should be unbounded in the sense that every normal function
on the ordinals has a fixed-point of kind Φ, then we should incorporate this fact into
what we hold as our canonically justified best theory of sets. Hence, our canonical
best theory will be at least ZFC2+ “Every normal function on the ordinals has a
fixed-point of kind Φ”, and hence every CZ-universe will satisfy the corresponding
reflection principle, thereby justifying its status as an axiom.
3.2 Ordinal closure as indescribability.
In fact, by extending the Universist’s appeal to ordinal closure to indescribability prop-
erties, the Zermelian can provide direct motivation for the non-vacuity of reflection
principles. We begin by noting the following definition scheme:
Definition 9. For Q = Σ or Q = Π and m,n ∈ ω, a cardinal κ is
Qmn -indescribable iff for any formula φ of Qmn complexity and parame-
ter A ⊆ Vκ with m-order over any Vα quantifiers interpreted as ranging
over Vα+m we have:
(Vκ+0, ..., Vκ+m, A,∈) |= φ→ ∃β < κ(Vβ+0, ..., Vβ+m, Vβ ∩A,∈) |= φ
Often authors will make similar claims about the ordinals under indescribability
as was made concerning fixed-points of normal functions. Turning again to Drake,
he writes:
“A natural way of looking for larger cardinals is to take a process which
generates larger ordinals (or cardinals) and to look for ordinals α where
the process closes: or we could look at ways of generating sets and look
for ordinals α such that the process is closed on Vα.
An extension of this method, which perhaps comes almost as naturally
when one remembers that the aim is to say that there is no end to the
ordinals is to ask for ordinals such that any process we have has already
closed before this stage.” ([Drake, 1974], p267)
A little exposition is required to see the link between these ‘processes for gen-
eration’ and indescribability. To begin with, consider inaccessibles. Their definition
ensures that they are closed under repeated application of the Axiom of Replacement
and Power Set. Hyperinaccessibles are also closed under the ‘processes’ of Replace-
ment and Power Set, but moreover are closed under the formation of inaccessibles.
We can link these closure properties to (in)describability. We begin by noting that
these ordinals are often described by processes as follows:
Definition 10. An ordinal κ is described by formula φ and parametersA0, ..., An
iff (Vκ+0, ..., Vκ+m, A,∈) |= φ ∧ ¬∃β < κ(Vβ+0, ..., Vβ+m, Vβ ∩A,∈) |= φ.
Describability provides one way of expressing the idea that an ordinal can be
generated from another. To take a simple case, consider the case when κ is singular
(and so can be formed by application of Replacement and Union from a smaller
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ordinal46). Let λ = cf(κ) < κ and a function f : λ −→ κ witness κ’s singularity.
Further, let A0 = f and A1 = {λ} be parameters. We then describe κ using the
following (first-order) sentence:
φ =df A1 6= ∅ ∧ ∀x ∈ A1x = dom(A0)
We then have that (Vκ,∈, A0, A1) |= φ, but for allα < κ, (Vα,∈, A0∩Vα, A1,∩Vα) 6|= φ.47
Here, the fact that κ is generated by an application of Replacement and Union using
f and λ provides us with the tools to give a description (with parameters) of κ. To
say then that κ is of a certain level of indescribability, is to say that there are no opera-
tions and parameters for generating ordinals (of the relevant complexity) that allow
us to describe κ in this way. The parameters have already ‘closed out’ within a Vα
for α < κ, and it is to this phenomenon that Drake is alluding.
Here we see that the ordinal closure appealed to is very similar to the derivatives
approach: we are claiming that certain ways of generating ordinals must already
have ‘run out’ at some earlier stage in the sense that there are smaller ordinals in-
dexing stages closed under these methods. There are close affinities between the
cardinals described previously and those generated by indescribability. Indeed, in-
describability is simply the more general property: Π10-indescribability is equivalent
to being inaccessible, and every Π11-indescribable cardinal is Mahlo. Arguing for
indescribable cardinals through ordinal closure, while subtly different from justifi-
cation involving fixed-points, is nonetheless similar.
If the generalisation of ordinal closure to indescribability is accepted, we now
have the resources to provide direct justification for the non-vacuity of certain reflec-
tion principles on the Zermelian’s view. Suppose that we can argue for the existence
of indescribable cardinals on the basis of the unboundedness of the ordinals given
by the Iterative Conception. Just as before, the Zermelian Multiversist is able to say
that she agrees that the ordinal number sequence should be closed in this sense.
Hence there are PZ-universes containing these indescribable cardinals. Indeed, if it
is entailed by our conception of set that there are cardinals of a certain level of inde-
scribability, then our canonical set theory should reflect this, and hence we should
hold that the CZ-universes contain such cardinals.
Now, let V be one such CZ-universe. V can see a cardinal κ such that for any
property φ of the relevant level of describability and parameter A,
(Vκ+0, ..., Vκ+m, A,∈) |= φ → ∃β < κ(Vβ+0, ..., Vβ+m, Vβ ∩ A,∈) |= φ. But this is just
to say that Vκ is a PZ-universe satisfying that fragment of reflection. In particular,
if it is part of our conception of set that there are totally indescribable cardinals, then
every CZ-universe can see a PZ-universe satisfying reflection of all second-order
formulae.
Of course, this does nothing to establish the truth of reflection axioms in the sense
of being true in every CZ-universe. Even if a CZ-universe V can see PZ-universes
satisfying a certain amount of reflection, this is no guarantee that V itself satisfies the
same principles. However, we should be mindful that the position is the same for
the Universist: the generation of indescribable cardinals merely provides strongly
inaccessible Vα that satisfy reflection, without guaranteeing that V itself reflects to
initial segments.48 Assuming that the justification of these cardinals can stand on
46We use Replacement to obtain ran(f) as a set, and then use Union to get ∪ran(f) = κ.
47To see this, note that we may divide into two cases: (i) κ > α > λ, (ii) α ≤ λ. For (i) We may assume
that f is monotone, as any non-monotone cofinal sequence will contain a monotone part. Then, Vα ∩ A0
will always remove some ordered pairs from A0 (f is proper-class-sized in Vκ) and hence dom(A0) 6= λ.
For (ii) note that α ≤ λ implies that A1 ∩ Vα = ∅.
48As an example of this, suppose that there is a measurable cardinal κ. We claim that for α totally
indescribable, Vα need not even be Σ02-correct. For, there are many such Vα below Vκ, all of which satisfy
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its own, the non-vacuity of discourse involving the relevant reflection is assured for
both Zermelian and Universist.
3.3 Tait’s ‘Bottom Up’ approach.
Before discussing strong reflection principles, it will serve to mention one more kind
of justification for weak reflection principles, namely Tait’s ‘bottom up’ approach.
Tait’s method is very closely linked to the previous discussion, asserting that initial
segments of ordinals are closed under particular conditions. We shall see again that
if the Universist is able to use this motivation, then so can the Zermelian, for very
similar reasons as in the case of indescribability. The approach is particularly useful
as it highlights a feature that the Universist will have to appeal to if she is to motivate
reflection where the Zermelian cannot, namely global considerations. We start from
a condition C (which Tait calls an ‘existence condition’). We then use the condition
to construct an ordinal ΩC closed under C using the following principle:
“If the initial segment Σ of ΩC satisfies the condition C, then it has a least
strict upper bound S(Σ) ∈ ΩC” ([Tait, 2005], p2)
Selecting the appropriate existence condition C then allows us to construct cardi-
nals ΩC such that VΩC satisfies φ reflection. For example, if we take the condition V
on Σ ⊆ ΩC to be:
∃X ⊆ VΣ[VΣ |= φ(X) ∧ ∀α ∈ Σ¬φVα(XVα)].
we obtain a VΩC that satisfies full second-order reflection.
49 Choosing different
existence conditions then facilitates the generation of cardinals satisfying various
forms of reflection.
Certainly, there are deep problems with this approach, not least because it is un-
clear which existence conditions are satisfactory. For instance, if we take C to be
VΣ 6|= “There exists a Reinhardt cardinal” we get a VΩC that satisfies that there is a
Reinhardt cardinal. This is clearly problematic, not least because it contradicts the
Axiom of Choice ([Koellner, 2009], p209)!
Let us assume that, however, we can differentiate the ‘good’ conditions from the
bad in a principled fashion. For exactly the same reasons as in the indescribability
case, the non-vacuity of reflection is assured: Tait’s principles generate PZ-universes
satisfying different kinds of reflection (namely the relevant VΩC ). Such an approach
will be dialectically available to the Zermelian Multiversist: the satisfaction of reflec-
tion is achieved through generating particular VΩC that satisfy the reflection principle
locally (indeed Tait’s approach is explicitly designed to work within the Zermelian
Multiversist’s framework). Thus, even if the Universist can make sense of Tait’s
method, it can still be used by the Zermelian to justify weak reflection principles on
exactly the same grounds. Again, the construction of the relevant VΩC will occur rel-
ative to some ambient V , and for the same reasons as in the case of indescribability,
we do not necessitate the truth of reflection in every CZ-universe. However, once
more the position of Zermelian and Universist is the same: they both have secured
the non-vacuity of discourse involving the relevant reflection, rather than the truth
of the reflection principles as axioms.
that there are no measurable cardinals (a Σ02 statement).
49For a more detailed exposition see [Tait, 2005] and [Koellner, 2009] (the example in question is Koell-
ner’s).
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4 Richness as ineffability.
Let us take stock. We have seen that if the Universist can justify weak reflection prin-
ciples via arguments involving the closure of the ordinals under particular kinds of
operation, the Zermelian Multiversist is able to justify very similar local reflection
principles that hold relative to PZ-universes of the appropriate kind. There is a dif-
ferent method of justifying reflection principles via richness assumptions, one that
applies to both weak and strong reflection principles. In this section, I will analyse
this kind of Universist argument, and argue that the Zermelian Multiversist can also
motivate similar principles. In particular, if the Universist can use a particular moti-
vation to motivate [RP3], the Zermelian can motivate a form of local reflection that
allows her to say that PD is true.
The method simply takes ineffability to be our criterion of richness. This would
then allow us to motivate both strong and weak reflection principles as characterisa-
tions of this ineffability.
Welch develops the point as follows:
“We have simply declared that the whole universe (V,∈, C) is so rich that
there is some κ so that the collection of parts over Vκ, namely Vκ+1, is in
turn sufficiently rich so that any sentential truth we can formulate about
the realm V with all of its parts (in the given language) reflects to a truth
about Vκ with all of its parts.” ([Welch, 2014], p16)
Here we see Welch claim that the set-theoretic universe should be sufficiently
rich (in the sense that there are sufficiently many sets of varied kinds) that we are
unable to distinguish the universe from one of its initial segments. In the case of
weak reflection principles, we assert that no one sentence of any language can pin
down the universe, and hence each sentence held by the universe must be reflected
down to some Vα. With [RP3] we assert that the universe is so rich that not even a
fragment of an entire language (not just a sentence thereof) can pin it down: thus the
true sentences of the whole fragment are reflected down to some (Vβ ,∈, Vβ+1). Such
a justification (as Welch is clear) goes substantially beyond the Iterative Conception of
Set: it depends on not just principles of iteration but also advocates a global richness
concerning V . In this sense then, the conceptual analysis involved in the intrinsic
justification occurs with respect to an enriched conception of set, combining both
iterativity and this notion of richness.
One might think that there is a real problem for the Zermelian Multiversist here.
For Welch’s justification, unlike the specific cases of indescribability and Tait’s ap-
proach, is explicitly global: it depends on an overall richness in V facilitating the
embedding. The Zermelian Multiversist, on the other hand, does not have V to
which she can appeal as sufficiently rich to facilitate the satisfaction of [RP3] by any
particular V .
4.1 Using richness to respond to the Universist.
We should not be satisfied with this simplistic characterisation, however, and should
probe a little deeper into how reflection principles, in particular those of sufficient
strength to prove PD, are motivated through richness.
As it stands the notion of ‘richness’ facilitating the level of ineffability required is
exceptionally unclear. If the Universist can appeal to a general principle of ‘richness’
that follows from an unfolding of our concept of set, then so can the Zermelian Mul-
tiversist. This provides the material for the Zermelian to generate a response to the
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Universist. The Zermelian may assert that she agrees, on the basis of our (enriched)
concept of set the subject matter of Set Theory should be as structurally rich as possi-
ble and contain many and varied sets. Given this, she can say, it is entirely reasonable
that we should expect (as part of a conceptual analysis of this ‘rich’ conception of set)
there to be a V = Vβ that reflects properties to its initial segments.
For any particular notion of weak reflection supported by direct ineffability argu-
ments arising from the enriched conception of set on the Universist picture, there is
then a V satisfying the same reflection principle for the Zermelian. The case of strong
reflection is exactly analogous. The Zermelian can argue, on the basis of the enriched
concept of set, that there should be a V = Vβ and an ordinal κ < β such that there is
a non-trivial j : (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1) −→ (Vβ ,∈, Vβ+1). Any such Vβ must, by [RP3], contain
β-many measurable Woodin cardinals and satisfy PD. Moreover, since the first few
levels above Vω are the same in every PZ-universe of the Zermelian Multiversist’s
ontology, and she has justified the claim that there is a V in which PD is true, she
may assert that PD is true in every CZ-universe and hence true simpliciter.
There is a possible response that the Universist may give. All the Universist need
appeal to, he could argue, is a structural richness about V : his universe of sets. He
makes no assumptions about the height of V . From this, he argues for a particular
reflection principle that reflects properties down to some Vα. The argument, the
Universist contends, is exactly not analogous for the Zermelian Multiversist. For she
does have to make assumptions about the height of the particular V with which she
is working. In order to motivate the reflection principles, she must assume that their
PZ-universes extend far enough to make it true that there is a V that reflects the
relevant properties to its initial segments.
The Universist might bolster this by asking us to consider the argument from
[RP3]. There he merely stated that the universe was structurally rich enough for
there to be a Vκ that reflected V and all its parts. We do not assume that the universe
need have any particular height. However, the Universist might contend that the
Zermelian Multiversist does have to make assumptions about the height of the uni-
verses in question. For in any PZ-universe in which there do not exist the required
cardinals (of which there are quite a few), [RP3] will be false. Therefore, in justifying
[RP3] as satisfied by some V = Vβ we must in fact assume that there is a β above β-
many measurable Woodin cardinals. To put it another way, if there were not proper-
class-many measurable Woodin cardinals relative to some V = Vβ , we would not get
inconsistency for the Zermelian Multiversist. We would rather just get no models of
the required height. The Zermelian Multiversist’s commitment to richness thus does
not in itself (the Universist contends) imply the existence of proper-class-many mea-
surable Woodin cardinals on her ontology. Even given a commitment to the richness
of the stages by the Zermelian Multiversist, the Universist will argue that she must
assume the very thing she is trying to prove.
This is an example of a particular kind of bad argument that can be made against
the Zermelian Multiversist. Here, the Universist has noted that as a consequence of
a certain kind of principle holding in V = Vβ , a model of set theory was generated:
in this case both the relevant (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1) and (Vβ ,∈, Vβ+1). Then, the Universist
argues, that model was assumed to be there all along and hence the Zermelian Mul-
tiversist was assuming the very thing she was trying to prove. But the fact that
a particular model was generated does not mean that it was assumed to exist all
along! Indeed, in order for Welch’s principle to hold for the Universist, the ordinal
number sequence must have a minimal length and contain certain subsets at addi-
tional stages. A direct consequence of his argument that there are proper class many
measurable Woodin cardinals is that there must be some Vα in his ontology that is
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numerically identical (from his perspective) to the Vβ generated by the Zermelian
Multiversist. Hence, the Zermelian assumed the existence of the required model no
more than the Universist did. If we examine the steps in the Zermelian Multiver-
sist’s argument, we can see that at no point did she make mention of the specific
height of the models in question, she just argued that the enriched concept of set
implied that the PZ-universes are sufficiently structurally rich that there is one PZ-
universe (whatever its ordinal height may be) with the collection of all its parts that
is non-trivially elementarily embeddable into some other PZ-universe (whatever its
ordinal height may be) with the collection of all its parts. There is no appeal to the
specific height of the model anywhere, and the Zermelian Multiversist is in exactly
the same position as the Universist with respect to motivating the existence of V in
which there are good theories of the Iterative Conception (in the senses of varieties
of ordinal unboundedness) and justifying the truth of PD.
So, if the Universist can motivate reflection principles via conceptual analysis
of an enriched concept of set, then the Zermelian Multiversist is able to motivate
the existence of PZ-universes satisfying [RP3] and PZ-universes satisfying weak
reflection. Hence (assuming that the Universist justification is legitimate) she (i)
gives herself the means to interpret set-theoretic discourse involving weak reflec-
tion and [RP3] as non-vacuous, and (ii) thereby ensures the truth of PD in every
PZ-universe. It would make sense to stop here, the Zermelian Multiversist has se-
cured the desirable theoretical consequences given by both PD and (in certain V)
ordinal unboundedness, and also avoided issues of being unable to motivate the ex-
istence of PZ-universes needed for interpreting set-theorists. However, one further
loose end needs to be tied up: why assert that the relevant reflection principles are
axioms in the sense of being true in every CZ-universe?
Here, an important asymmetry between Universist and Zermelian Multiversist is
highlighted. For any notion of reflection [RP ] satisfied by a particular V meeting the
enriched conception of set, it is unclear that the next V ′ above V does not meet the
enriched conception. For, V ′ can see a PZ-universe (namely V) satisfying [RP ], but
also contains more sets than V . It is not usual, however, that such a V will satisfy
[RP ].
To see this more clearly, consider [RP3]. Assuming that the Universist has mo-
tivated [RP3] as true of (V,∈, C), she will have justified its truth as an axiom: the
principle is true in V , and V is the ultimate arbiter of truth. The same is not obviously
true for the Zermelian, however. While she has justified the truth of [RP3] (or weak
reflection) as true relative to some (V ′,∈, C′), it is not yet clear that [RP3] (or weak
reflection) is true in every CZ-universe. For, her conceptual analysis of the enriched
concept of set allowed her to maintain that the subject matter of set theory should
be sufficiently rich that [RP3] is satisfied by some (V ′,∈, C′). But it is as yet unclear
that every CZ-universe will satisfy [RP3]. Indeed, if (V ′,∈, C′) satisfies [RP3] then
the next PZ-universe above V ′ will in general not satisfy [RP3]. To see this, note
that any V ′ = Vα satisfying [RP3] is indexed by a limit of inaccessible cardinals (see,
for example, [Kanamori, 2009], p312). However, the next PZ-universe above V ′ will
be indexed by a successor inaccessible, and so cannot satisfy [RP3]. In the case of
the Universist, the global richness they ascribe to the concept of set means that it is
the Universe that satisfies [RP3]. For the Zermelian the enriched concept of set only
justifies the existence of at least one (or possibly some) PZ-universe(s) of the required
kind.
Despite this limitation, the non-vacuity of mathematics involving [RP3] and weak
reflection is assured, as is the truth of PD. The issue of ordinal unboundedness is
somewhat more vexed. For a PZ-universe V satisfying a reflection principle [RP ]
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that implies ordinal unboundedness of kind Φ, the next PZ-universe above V will
(i) not satisfy [RP ] (as it will be a garden variety inaccessible and thus not have ordi-
nal unboundedness of kind Φ), and (ii) potentially still meet the enriched conception
of set in virtue of seeing a PZ-universe satisfying [RP ]. However, the possibility of
analysing additional justifications (in particular those arising from the enriched con-
cept of set) to limit the CZ-universes to just those PZ-universes satisfying reflection
is open to the Zermelian. It is eminently plausible, for instance, that any PZ-universe
meeting the enriched concept of set should be unbounded in the senses of §3. Such
an argument requires a fuller defence than space permits here, but would guarantee
that the ordinals are also unbounded in every CZ-universe.
We should, however, be mindful that, modulo the tenability of the Universist’s
justification from the enriched conception, the Zermelian is able to secure some PZ-
universe satisfying the relevant reflection on the basis of the enriched conception of
set. Of particular philosophical interest is that, in the case of [RP3], she secures the
truth of PD and the pleasing theoretical consequences it implies.
Conclusion.
Motivating reflection principles has often been seen as a substantial challenge for the
Zermelian Multiversist: she does not countenance the existence of V which might
lead one to believe that the project of intrinsic justification via reflection is hopeless
on her view. The argument is, however, far too quick: for certain justifications pro-
vided by Universists, the Zermelian Multiversist may just as well appeal to the same
underlying justification. While questions concerning the status of reflection princi-
ples as axioms remain open on the Zermelian picture, she is able to justify far more
than previously thought.
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